Konstantin Ramul: erinevus redaktsioonide vahel
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53. rida:
While traditional logic helps us check the correctness of our thinking, there is no logic or other aid for inventive or creative thinking. The following 7 general rules are suggested for helping children learn to think creatively: Don't hurry with
the solution of problems. Ascertain all the information necessary to solve the problem. Preserve flexibility of thinking. Avoid negative transfer from one problem to another. Avoid functional fixedness. Realize that the solution of many modern problems requires a large fund of technical knowledge. Realize that in some cases solutions are found accidently. Examples of problems are given where these rules may be helpful.
* Ramul, K. Psychologische Demonstrationsversuche [Psychological experiments for demonstrations]. Johann Ambrosius Barth: Leipzig. 87 pp., 1961<br />
This small collection, translated from the Russian original, describes some well-known demonstrations suitable for an introductory course in perception.
* Ramul', K. A. Psikhologiia v Tartuskom Universitete [Psychology in Tartu University]. Voprosy Psychologii 6 (2): 128-134, 1960<br />
An account is given of psychological research and teaching at Tartu University from 1802-1918.
* Ramul', K. A. Iz istorii psikhologicheskogo eksperimenta [From the history of the psychological experiment]. Voprosy Psychologii 6 (6): 137-144, 1960<br />
The main stages in the historical development of the psychological experiment, exclusive of the present, are discussed along with the factors behind this development.
* Ramul, Konstantin The problem of measurement in the psychology of the eighteenth century. American Psychologist 15: 256-265, 1960<br />
Hitherto "largely unknown opinions of a number of eighteenth century philosophical and nonphilosophical writers regarding the possibilities and methods of psychological measurements" are considered in approximately chronological order. Writers mentioned include Christian von Wolff, Andrew Michael Ramsay, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Christian August Crusius, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Friedrich Johann Buck, Moses Mendelssohn, Gottfried Ploucquet, Charles Bonnet, Hans Bernhard Merian, Johann Heinrich
Lambert, Johann August Eberhard, Gottlieb Friedrich Hagen, Johann Gottlieb Krueger, and Christian Albrecht Koerber. "The question of the measurement of mental phenomena did not by any means remain alien to the inquiring genius of the eighteenth century."
* Ramul, K. A. Demonstratsionnye opyty po psikhologii [Demonstration experiments in psychology]. State Univer., Tartu. 97 pp., 1959<br />
Classroom demonstrations in universities or high schools differ from laboratory experiments in that they have to present basic facts or illustrate some principle (rather than investigate) and be simple, inexpensive, and short. All students should be able to
participate or observe the readings of instruments or of curves in the making. Over 70 experiments--from reflexes to problem solving, fantasy, expression of emotions, etc.-- are described with details of apparatus construction and advice for beginner teachers.
* Ramul, K. Psychologische Schulversuche [Psychological school investigations]. Barth: Leipzig. 80 pp., 1936.<br />
The book is subtitled: A contribution to the method of psychological teaching. It contains 20 chapters, touching upon such topics as: visual and auditory impressions, perception, presentation of material, imagination, association processes, memory, attention, intelligence, emotions, personality, suggestion, and work and fatigue.
* Ramul, K. Moderne Physik und Psychologie [Modern physics and psychology]. Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie 97: 47-72, 1936<br />
Psychology tries to find proofs of its findings (1) by inferences from the physical realm, and (2) by using the methods of physics. The author shows that no great value has accured to psychology from this attempt; he feels that there is too much optimism among scientists as to the more general application of the findings and methods of the new physics. Care should be taken not to generalize their use to the psychological field.
* Ramul, K. Psychologie und Geschichte [Psychology and history]. Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie 95: 1-14, 1936<br />
The historian needs fundamental ideas of human behavior, he needs knowledge of the character patterns of specific individuals and groups and of how such patterns have been produced, and he needs to understand the intellectual and emotional background of character. All these psychology can furnish. Psychology takes three directions which are not so valuable to the historian: (1) it is microscopic rather than macroscopic; (2) it is interested in the general character of experiences, the historian in concrete cases and events; (3) it studies reactions rather than causes, while history must know the background of cause. In the main
history gains from the psychology that is oriented toward description of mental functions of individuals and groups, rather than from that oriented toward physiological study.
* Ramul, K. Ueber nichtempirische Psychologie [Non-empirical psychology]. Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie 73: 369-406, 1929.<br />
This article answers the questions of the nature of non-empirical psychology and its relations to experimental-empirical psychology. The author bases his presentation of non-empirical psychology on statements of such men as Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, Schmied-Kowarzik, Tschelpanow, Dilthey, Stumpf, and Lipps. The task of this type of psychology is to analyze and describe the data of mental life, and to fix and clarify psychological concepts, all of which is to be done not by following the methods of empirical sciences, but rather those of mathematics. But is it possible to create such a "geometry of experience"? It would seem so, if we consider non-empirical statements. Here we have no massing of observations, no induction. Such material is empirical in the sense that we need experience in order to come into its possession, but the judgments themselves do not necessitate additional experience. They are certain, apodictical,comparable to the judgments of mathematics and therefore capable of forming a
basis for other sciences. Non-empirical psychology differs from mathematics in its absolute dependence on the data of experience and in its chiefly descriptive character. In his critical comments, the author objects to the claim of nonempirical
psychology that complete description must always precede explanation as a necessary condition of scientific progress. He also doubts whether a phenomenological method alone is capable of solving all questions of a descriptive kind, e.g., the difference between a perception and a hallucination; real observation is essential in such cases. He denies that a non-empirical psychology
can serve an experimental psychology in the same sense in which mathematics serves physics.
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