Kasutaja:Pietadè/Vene-Ukraina sõda

Allikas: Russo-Ukrainian War (5. IV 2022)

Vene-Ukraina sõda
Olukord rinnetel
  Ukraina Vabariigi kontrollitud alad
  Venemaa Föderatsiooni ja separatistide okupeeritud alad
  Transnistria/Venemaa
Detailsem kaart (ingliskeelne Vikipeedia)
Toimumisaeg 20. veebruar 2014 –
Toimumiskoht Ukraina
Hetkeseis käimasolev
Osalised
Ukraina Venemaa
DRV
LRV

Vene-Ukraina sõda on käimasolev sõda Venemaa (koos venemeelsete separatistlike jõududega) ja Ukraina vahel. Sõda algas 2014. aasta veebruaris pärast Ukraina Väärikuse revolutsiooni ja keskendus esialgu Krimmi ja rahvusvaheliselt Ukraina osana tunnustatud Donbassi osade staatusele. Konflikti esimesed kaheksa aastat hõlmasid Krimmi annekteerimist Venemaa poolt (2014) ja sõda Donbassis (2014 - praeguseni) Ukraina ja Venemaa toetatud separatistide vahel, samuti mereväeintsidente, kübersõda ja poliitilisi pingeid. Pärast Venemaa sõjalise tegevuse intensiivistumist Venemaa ja Ukraina piiril alates 2021. aasta lõpust laienes konflikt märkimisväärselt, kui Venemaa alustas 24. veebruaril 2022 täiemahulist sissetungi Ukrainasse.

Pärast Euromaidani meeleavaldusi ja revolutsiooni, mille tulemusel kõrvaldati 2014. aasta veebruaris venemeelne president Viktor Janukovõtš, puhkesid Ukraina osades venemeelsed rahutused. Eraldusmärkideta Vene sõjaväelased võtsid üle strateegilised positsioonid ja infrastruktuuri Ukraina territooriumil Krimmis ning hõivasid Krimmi parlamendi. Venemaa korraldas laialdaselt kritiseeritud referendumi, mille tulemusel Krimm liitus Venemaaga. Seejärel annekteeris ta Krimmi. 2014. aasta aprillis eskaleerusid venemeelsete rühmituste meeleavaldused Ukraina Donbassi piirkonnas sõjaks Ukraina sõjaväe ja Venemaa toetatud Donetski ja Luhanski vabariikide isehakanud separatistide vahel.

2014. aasta augustis ületasid märgistamata Vene sõjaväe sõidukid piiri Donetski vabariiki. Algas väljakuulutamata sõda ühelt poolt Ukraina vägede ja teiselt poolt Vene vägedega segunenud separatistide vahel, kuigi Venemaa püüdis oma osalust varjata. Sõda kujunes staatiliseks konfliktiks, mille käigus tehti korduvalt ebaõnnestunud relvarahukatsed. 2015. aastal kirjutasid Venemaa ja Ukraina alla Minsk II kokkulepetele, kuid mitmed vaidlused takistasid nende täielikku rakendamist. 2019. aastaks liigitas Ukraina valitsus 7% Ukrainast ajutiselt okupeeritud aladeks, samas kui Venemaa valitsus oli kaudselt tunnistanud oma vägede kohalolekut Ukrainas.

2021. aastal ja 2022. aasta alguses toimus Ukraina piiride ümber Venemaa ulatuslik sõjaline suurendamine. NATO süüdistas Venemaad sissetungi kavandamises, mida ta eitas. Venemaa president Vladimir Putin kritiseeris NATO laienemist kui ohtu tema riigile ja nõudis, et Ukrainale keelataks sõjalise alliansiga kunagi ühineda. Ta väljendas ka Venemaa irredentistlikke vaateid (maa põlisasukatele tagastamise poliitika), seadis kahtluse alla Ukraina eksisteerimisõiguse ja väitis vääralt, et Ukraina on loodud Nõukogude Venemaa poolt. 21. veebruaril 2022 tunnustas Venemaa ametlikult kahte isehakanud separatistlikku riiki Donbassis ja saatis sinna avalikult vägesid. Kolm päeva hiljem tungis Venemaa Ukrainasse. Suur osa rahvusvahelisest kogukonnast on Venemaa oma tegevuse pärast revolutsioonijärgses Ukrainas hukka mõistnud, süüdistades teda rahvusvahelise õiguse rikkumises ja Ukraina suveräänsuse rikkumises. Paljud riigid rakendasid majandussanktsioone Venemaa, Venemaa üksikisikute või ettevõtete vastu, eriti pärast 2022. aasta sissetungi.


Background muuda

Post-Soviet context and Orange Revolution muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis Oranž revolutsioon

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine and Russia maintained close ties. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Former Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine were removed to Russia and dismantled.[1] In return, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) agreed to uphold the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine through the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.[2][3] In 1999, Russia was one of the signatories of the Charter for European Security, which "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve".[4] In the years after the dissolution of the USSR, several former Eastern Bloc countries joined NATO, partly in response to regional security threats involving Russia such as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the First Chechen War (1994–1996). Russian leaders described this expansion as a violation of Western powers' informal assurances that NATO would not expand eastward.[5][6]

The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was controversial. During the election campaign, opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned by TCDD dioxin;[7][8] he later implicated Russian involvement.[9] In November, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was declared the winner, despite allegations of vote-rigging by election observers.[10] During a two-month period which became known as the Orange Revolution, large peaceful protests successfully challenged the outcome. After the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the initial result due to widespread electoral fraud, a second round re-run was held, bringing to power Yushchenko as president and Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister, and leaving Yanukovych in opposition.[11] The Orange Revolution is often grouped together with other early-21st century protest movements, particularly within the former USSR, known as colour revolutions. According to Anthony Cordesman, Russian military officers viewed such colour revolutions as an attempt by the US and European states to destabilise neighbouring countries and undermine Russia's national security.[12] Russian president Vladimir Putin accused organisers of the 2011–2013 Russian protests of being former advisors to Yushchenko, and described the protests as an attempt to transfer the Orange Revolution to Russia.[13] Rallies in favour of Putin during this period were called "anti-Orange protests".[14]

At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO. The response among NATO members was divided; Western European countries opposed offering Membership Action Plans (MAP) in order to avoid antagonising Russia, while US president George W. Bush pushed for their admission.[15] NATO ultimately refused to offer Ukraine and Georgia MAPs, but also issued a statement agreeing that "these countries will become members of NATO". Putin voiced strong opposition to Georgia and Ukraine's NATO membership bids.[16] By January 2022, the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO remained remote.[17]

Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and pro-Russian unrest muuda

  Pikemalt artiklites Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity ja 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine

In 2009, Yanukovych announced his intent to again run for president in the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election,[18] which he subsequently won.[19] In November 2013, a wave of large, pro-European Union (EU) protests erupted in response to Yanukovych's sudden decision not to sign the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. The Ukrainian parliament had overwhelmingly approved of finalizing the agreement with the EU.[20] Russia had put pressure on Ukraine to reject it.[21]

Following months of protests as part of the Euromaidan movement, on 21 February 2014 Yanukovych and the leaders of the parliamentary opposition signed a settlement agreement that called for early elections. The following day, Yanukovych fled from the capital ahead of an impeachment vote that stripped him of his powers as president.[22][23][24][25]

On 27 February, an interim government was established and early presidential elections were scheduled. The following day, Yanukovych resurfaced in Russia and in a press conference declared that he remained the acting president of Ukraine, just as Russia was beginning its overt military campaign in Crimea. Leaders of Russian-speaking eastern regions of Ukraine declared continuing loyalty to Yanukovych,[23][26] causing the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine. On 23 February, the parliament adopted a bill to repeal the 2012 law which gave Russian language an official status.[27] The bill was not enacted,[28] however, the proposal provoked negative reactions in the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine,[29] intensified by Russian media saying that the ethnic Russian population were in imminent danger.[30]

On 27 February, Berkut special police units from Crimea and other regions of Ukraine, which had been dissolved on 25 February, seized checkpoints on the Isthmus of Perekop and Chonhar peninsula.[31][32] According to Ukrainian MP Hennadiy Moskal, former chief of the Crimean police, these Berkut had armored personnel carriers, grenade launchers, assault rifles, machine guns, and other weapons.[32] Since then, they have controlled all land traffic between Crimea and continental Ukraine.[32] On 7 February 2014, a leaked audio revealed that United States Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland in Kyiv, was weighing in on the make-up of the next Ukrainian government. Nuland told United States Ambassador Geoffrey Pyatt that she did not think Vitaly Klitschko should be in a new government. The audio clip was first posted on Twitter by Dmitry Loskutov, an aide to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin.[33]

Russian bases in Crimea muuda

At the onset of its conflict, Russia had roughly 12,000 military personnel in the Black Sea Fleet,[30] located in several localities throughout Crimean peninsula like Sevastopol, Kacha, Hvardiiske, Simferopol Raion, Sarych, and several others. The disposition of the Russian armed forces in Crimea was not disclosed clearly to the public which led to several incidents like the 2005 conflict near Sarych cape lighthouse.[34]Mall:Failed verification Russian presence was allowed by the basing and transit agreement with Ukraine. According to the agreements Russian military component in Crimea was constrained, including a maximum of 25,000 troops, the requirement to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, honor its legislation and not interfere in the internal affairs of the country, and show their "military identification cards" when crossing the international border and their operations beyond designated deployment sites were permitted only after coordination with the competent agencies of Ukraine.[35] Early in the conflict, the agreement's sizeable troop limit allowed Russia to significantly reinforce its military presence under the plausible guise of security concern, deploy special forces and other required capabilities to conduct the operation in Crimea.[30]

According to the original treaty on division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet signed in 1997, Russia was allowed to have its military bases in Crimea until 2017, after which it had to evacuate all its military units including its portion of the Black Sea Fleet out of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. A Russian construction project to re-home to fleet in Novorossiysk launched in 2005 and was expected to be fully completed by 2020; as of 2010, the project faced major budget cuts and construction delays.[36] On 21 April 2010, former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych signed a new deal known as the Kharkiv Pact, to resolve the 2009 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute; it extended the stay until 2042 with an option to renew and in return receiving some discount on gas delivered from Russian.[37]

The Kharkiv Pact was rather an update to complex of several fundamental treaties that were signed in 1990s between prime ministers of both countries Viktor Chernomyrdin (Russia) and Pavlo Lazarenko (Ukraine), and presidents Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and Leonid Kuchma (Ukraine).[38][39][40][41]Mall:Non-primary source needed The Constitution of Ukraine, whilst having a general prohibition of a deployment of foreign bases on the country's soil, originally also had a transitional provision, which allowed the use of existing military bases on the territory of Ukraine for the temporary stationing of foreign military formations; this permitted Russian military to keep its basing in Crimea as an "existing military base". The constitutional provision on "[pre]-existing bases" was revoked in 2019, when Russia had already annexed Crimea and withdrew from the basing treaties unilaterally.[42]

History muuda

Mall:Copy edit

2014 Russian annexation of Crimea muuda

  Pikemalt artiklites Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation ja Timeline of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
 
The blockade of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the capture of Crimea by Russia in February–March 2014
 
Russian troops blocking the Ukrainian military base in Perevalne

On 20 February 2014, Russia began its annexation of Crimea.[43][44][45][46] On 22 and 23 February, Russian troops and special forces began moving into Crimea through Novorossiysk.[45] On 27 February, Russian forces without insignias began their advance into the Crimean Peninsula.[47] They took hold of strategic positions and captured the Crimean Parliament, raising a Russian flag. Security checkpoints were used to cut the Crimean Peninsula off from the rest of Ukraine and to restrict movement within the territory.[48][49][50][51]

In the following days, Russian soldiers secured key airports and a communications center.[52] Russian cyberattacks shut down websites associated with the Ukrainian Government, news media, and social media. Cyberattacks also enabled Russian access to the mobile phones of Ukrainian officials and members of parliament over the next few days—some of which had their phones disabled as a result—further severing lines of communication.[53]

On 1 March, the Russian legislature approved the use of armed forces, leading to an influx of Russian troops and military hardware into the peninsula.[52] In the following days, all remaining Ukrainian military bases and installations were surrounded and besieged, including the Southern Naval Base. After Russia formally annexed the peninsula on 18 March, Ukrainian military bases and ships were stormed by Russian forces. On 24 March, Ukraine ordered troops to withdraw; by 30 March, all Ukrainian forces had left the peninsula.

On 15 April, the Ukrainian parliament declared Crimea a territory temporarily occupied by Russia.[54] After the annexation, the Russian government increased its military presence in the region and leveraged nuclear threats to solidify the new status quo on the ground.[55] Russian president Vladimir Putin said that a Russian military task force would be established in Crimea.[56] In November, NATO stated that it believed Russia was deploying nuclear-capable weapons to Crimea.[57]

2014–2015 war in Donbas muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis Sõda Donbassis

Pro-Russian unrest muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine

The initial protests across southern and eastern Ukraine were largely native expressions of discontent with the new Ukrainian government.[58] Russian involvement at this stage was limited to voicing support for the demonstrations, and the emergence of the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk began as a small fringe group of protesters, independent of Russian control.[58][59] Russia would go on to take advantage of this, however, to launch a co-ordinated political and military campaign against Ukraine, as part of the broader Russo-Ukrainian War.[58][60] Putin gave legitimacy to the nascent separatist movement when he described the Donbas as part of the historic "New Russia" (Novorossiya) region, and issued a statement of bewilderment as how the region had ever become part of Ukraine in 1922 with the foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.[61]

When the Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the pro-Russian protests and arrested local separatist leaders in early March, these were replaced by people with ties to the Russian security services and interests in Russian businesses, probably by order of Russian intelligence.[62] By April 2014, Russians citizens had taken control of the separatist movement, and were supported by volunteers and materiel from Russia, including Chechen and Cossack militants.[63][64][65][66] According to DPR insurgent commander Igor Girkin, without this support in April, the movement would have fizzled out, as in it did in Kharkiv and Odessa.[67] The disputed referendum on the status of Donetsk Oblast was held on 11 May.[68][69][70]

These demonstrations, which followed the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and which were part of a wider group of concurrent pro-Russian protests across southern and eastern Ukraine, escalated into an armed conflict between the Russia-backed separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR respectively), and the Ukrainian government.[71][72] The SBU claimed key commanders of the rebel movement during the beginning of the conflict, including Igor Strelkov and Igor Bezler were Russian agents.[73][74] The prime minister of Donetsk People's Republic from May to August 2014 was a Russian citizen Alexander Borodai.[65]

From August 2014 all top positions in Donetsk and Luhansk have been held by Ukrainian citizens.[75][64] Russian volunteers are reported to make up from 15% to 80% of the combatants,[65][76][77][78][79] with many claimed to be former military personnel.[80][81] Recruitment for the Donbas insurgents was performed openly in Russian cities using private or voyenkomat facilities, as was confirmed by a number of Russian media.[80][82]

Economic and material circumstances in Donbas had generated neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a locally rooted, internally driven armed conflict. The role of the Kremlin's military intervention was paramount for the commencement of hostilities.[83]

March–July 2014 muuda

 
The Russian military buildup along Ukraine's eastern border in February–March 2014
 
The Donbas status referendums in May 2014 were not officially recognised by the Ukrainian government or any UN member state.[68]

In late March, Russia continued the buildup of military forces near the Ukrainian eastern border, reaching 30–40,000 troops by April.[84][30] The deployment was likely used to threaten escalation and stymie Ukraine's response to unfolding events.[30] Concerns were expressed that Russia may again be readying an incursion into Ukraine following its annexation of Crimea.[84] This threat forced Ukraine to divert force deployment to its borders instead of the conflict zone.[30]

In April, armed conflict begins in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed separatist forces and Ukrainian government. The separatists declared the People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. From 6 April, Militants occupied government buildings in many cities, as well as, taking control of border crossings to Russia, transport hubs, broadcasting center, and other strategic infrastructure. Faced with continued expansion of separatist territorial control, on 15 April the Ukrainian interim government launched an "Anti-Terrorist Operation" (ATO), however, Ukrainian military and security services were poorly prepared and ill-positioned and the operation quickly stalled.[85]

By the end of April, the Ukrainian Government announced it had no full control of the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, being on "full combat alert" against a possible Russian invasion and reinstatement of conscription to the armed forces.[86] Through May, Ukrainian campaign focused on containing the separatists by securing key positions around the ETO zone to position the military for a decisive offensive against the rebel enclave once Ukraine's national mobilization complete.

As conflict between the separatists and the Ukrainian government escalated in May, Russia began to employ a "hybrid approach", deploying a combination of disinformation tactics, irregular fighters, regular Russian troops, and conventional military support to support the separatists and destabilise the Donbas region.[87][88][89] The First Battle of Donetsk Airport that followed the Ukrainian presidential elections marked a turning point in conflict; it was the first battle between the separatists and the Ukrainian government that involved large numbers of Russian volunteers.[90][91]: 15  According to the Ukrainian government, at the height of the conflict in the summer of 2014, Russian paramilitaries were reported to make up between 15% to 80% of the combatants.[65] From June Russia trickled in arms, armor, and munitions to the separatist forces.

By the end of July, they were pushing into Donetsk and Luhansk cities, to cut off supply routes between the two, isolating Donetsk and thought to restore control of the Russo-Ukrainian border. By 28 July, the strategic heights of Savur-Mohyla were under Ukrainian control, along with the town of Debaltseve an important railroad hub.[92] These operational successes of Ukrainian forces threatened the very existence of Russian-supported DPR and LPR statelets, prompting Russian cross-border artillery shelling targeted against advancing Ukrainian troops on their own soil, from mid-July onwards.

American and Ukrainian officials said they had evidence of Russian interference in Ukraine, including intercepted communications between Russian officials and Donbas insurgents.[93][94]

Ukrainian media have described the well-organised and well-armed pro-Russian militants as similar to those which occupied regions of Crimea during the Crimean crisis.[95][96] The former deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Admiral Ihor Kabanenko, said that the militants are Russian military reconnaissance and sabotage units.[97] Arsen Avakov stated that the militants in Krasnyi Lyman used Russian-made AK-100 series assault rifles fitted with grenade launchers, and that such weapons are only issued in the Russian Federation. "The Government of Ukraine is considering the facts of today as a manifestation of external aggression by Russia," said Avakov.[98] Militants in Sloviansk arrived in military lorries without license plates.[99] A reporter from Russia's Novaya Gazeta, having visited separatist artillery positions in Avdeyevka, wrote that in his opinion "it's impossible that the cannons are handled by volunteers" as they require a trained and experienced team, including observers and adjustment experts.[100]

August 2014 Russian invasion muuda

 
June–August 2014 progression map

After a series of military defeats and setbacks for the Donetsk and Luhansk separatists, who united under the banner of "Novorossiya", a term Russian President Vladimir Putin used to describe southeastern Ukraine,[101][102] Russia dispatched what it called a "humanitarian convoy" of trucks across the Russo-Ukrainian border in mid-August 2014. Ukraine reacted to the move by calling it a "direct invasion".[103] Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council published a report on the number and contents of these convoys, claiming they were arriving almost daily in November (up to 9 convoys on 30 November) and their contents were mainly arms and ammunition. In early August, according to Igor Strelkov, Russian servicemen, supposedly on "vacation" from the army, began to arrive in Donbas.[104]

By August 2014, the Ukrainian "Anti-Terrorist Operation" was able to vastly shrink the territory under the control of the pro-Russian forces, and came close to regaining control of the Russo-Ukrainian border.[105] Igor Girkin urged Russian military intervention, and said that the combat inexperience of his irregular forces, along with recruitment difficulties amongst the local population in Donetsk Oblast had caused the setbacks. He addressed Russian president Vladimir Putin, saying that: "Losing this war on the territory that President Vladimir Putin personally named New Russia would threaten the Kremlin's power and, personally, the power of the president".[106]

In response to the deteriorating situation in the Donbas, Russia abandoned its hybrid approach, and began a conventional invasion of the region.[105][107] The first sign of this invasion was 25 August 2014 capture of a group of Russian paratroopers on active service in Ukrainian territory by the Ukrainian security service (SBU).[108] The SBU released photographs of them, and their names.[109] On the following day, the Russian defence Ministry said these soldiers had crossed the border "by accident".[110][111][112] According to Nikolai Mitrokhin's estimates, by mid-August 2014 during the Battle of Ilovaisk, there were between 20,000 and 25,000 troops fighting in the Donbas on the separatist side, and only between 40% and 45% were "locals".[113]

On 24 August 2014, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko referred to the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) as Ukraine's "Patriotic War of 2014" and a war against "external aggression".[114][115] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine labeled the conflict an invasion on 27 August 2014.[116] The same day, Amvrosiivka was occupied by Russian paratroopers,[117] supported by 250 armoured vehicles and artillery pieces.[118] Ten Russian paratroopers of the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment, military unit 71211 from Kostroma, were captured in Dzerkalne that day, a village near Amvrosiivka, Mall:Convert from the border,[119] after their armoured vehicles were hit by Ukrainian artillery. On 25 August, the Security Service of Ukraine reported about the captured paratroopers, claiming they've crossed Ukrainian border in the night of 23 August.[120] The SBU also released their photos and names.[121] The next day, the Russian Ministry of Defence said that they had crossed the border "by accident".[119][122]

On 25 August, a column of Russian tanks and military vehicles was reported to have crossed into Ukraine in the southeast, near the town of Novoazovsk located on the Azov sea coast, and headed towards Ukrainian-held Mariupol,[123][124][125][126][127] in an area that had not seen pro-Russian presence for weeks.[128] The Bellingcat's investigation reveals some details of this operation.[129] Russian forces captured the city of Novoazovsk.[130] and Russian soldiers began arresting and deporting to unknown locations all Ukrainians who did not have an address registered within the town.[131] Pro-Ukrainian anti-war protests took place in Mariupol which was threatened by Russian troops.[131][132] The UN Security Council called an emergency meeting to discuss the situation.[133]

 
Residents of Kyiv with Sich Battalion volunteers on 26 August 2014

The 76th Guards Air Assault Division based in Pskov allegedly entered Ukrainian territory in August and engaged in a skirmish near Luhansk, suffering 80 dead. The Ukrainian Defence Ministry said that they had seized two of the unit's armoured vehicles near Luhansk city, and reported about another three tanks and two armoured vehicles of pro-Russian forces destroyed in other regions.[134][135] The Russian government denied the skirmish took place[135] but on 18 August, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division was awarded with Order of Suvorov, one of Russia's highest awards, by Russian minister of defence Sergey Shoigu for the "successful completion of military missions" and "courage and heroism".[135]

Russian media highlighted that the medal is awarded exclusively for combat operations and reported that a large number of soldiers from this division had died in Ukraine just days before, but their burials were conducted in secret.[136][137][138] Some Russian media, such as Pskovskaya Guberniya,[139] reported that Russian paratroopers may have been killed in Ukraine. Journalists traveled to Pskov, the reported burial location of the troops, to investigate. Multiple reporters said they had been attacked or threatened there, and that the attackers erased several camera memory cards.[140] Pskovskaya Guberniya revealed transcripts of phone conversations between Russian soldiers being treated in a Pskov hospital for wounds received while fighting in Ukraine. The soldiers reveal that they were sent to the war, but told by their officers that they were going on "an exercise".[141][142]

The speaker of Russia's upper house of parliament and Russian state television channels acknowledged that Russian soldiers entered Ukraine, but referred to them as "volunteers".[143] A reporter for Novaya Gazeta, an opposition newspaper in Russia, stated that the Russian military leadership paid soldiers to resign their commissions and fight in Ukraine in the early summer of 2014, and then began ordering soldiers into Ukraine. This reporter mentioned knowledge of at least one case when soldiers who refused were threatened with prosecution.[144] Russian opposition MP Lev Shlosberg made similar statements, although he said combatants from his country are "regular Russian troops", disguised as units of the DPR and LPR.[145]

In early September 2014, Russian state-owned television channels reported on the funerals of Russian soldiers who died in Ukraine during the war in Donbas, but described them as "volunteers" fighting for the "Russian world". Valentina Matviyenko, a top politician in the ruling United Russia party, also praised "volunteers" fighting in "our fraternal nation", referring to Ukraine.[143] Russian state television for the first time showed the funeral of a soldier killed fighting in east Ukraine. State-controlled TV station Channel One showed the burial of paratrooper Anatoly Travkin in the central Russian city of Kostroma. The broadcaster said Travkin had not told his wife or commanders about his decision to fight alongside pro-Russia rebels battling government forces. "Officially he just went on leave", the news reader said.[146]

Mariupol offensive and first Minsk ceasefire muuda

  Pikemalt artiklites Offensive on Mariupol (September 2014) ja Minsk agreements

On 3 September 2014, a Sky News team filmed groups of troops near Novoazovsk wearing modern combat gear typical for Russian units and traveling in new military vehicles with number plates and other markings removed. Specialists consulted by the journalists identified parts of the equipment (uniform, rifles) as currently used by Russian ground forces and paratroopers.[147]

Also on, 3 September, Ukrainian President Poroshenko said he had reached a "permanent ceasefire" agreement with Russian President Putin.[148] Russia denied the ceasefire agreement took place, denying being party to the conflict at all, adding that "they only discussed how to settle the conflict".[149][150] Poroshenko then backtracked from his previous statement about the agreement.[151][152]

Mick Krever wrote on the CNN blog that on 5 September Russia's Permanent Representative to the OSCE, Andrey Kelin had said it was natural pro-Russian separatists "are going to liberate" Mariupol. Ukrainian forces stated that Russian intelligence groups had been spotted in the area. Kelin said 'there might be volunteers over there.'[153] On 4 September 2014, a NATO officer said there were several thousand regular Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[154]

On 5 September 2014, the ceasefire agreement called the Minsk Protocol, drew a line of demarcation between Ukraine and separatist-controlled portions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the southeast of the country.

 
A map of the line of control and buffer zone established by the Minsk Protocol on 5 September 2014

November 2014 escalation muuda

On 7 November, NATO officials confirmed the continued invasion of Ukraine, with 32 Russian tanks, 16 howitzer cannons and 30 trucks of troops entering the country.[155] On 12 November, NATO reiterated the prevalence of Russian troops; US general Philip Breedlove said "Russian tanks, Russian artillery, Russian air defence systems and Russian combat troops" were sighted.[57] The Lithuanian Mission to the United Nations denounced Russia's 'undeclared war' on Ukraine.[156] Journalist Menahem Kahana took a picture showing a 1RL232 "Leopard" battlefield surveillance radar system in Torez, east of Donetsk; and Dutch freelance journalist Stefan Huijboom took pictures which showed the 1RL232 traveling with the 1RL239 "Lynx" radar system.[157]

OSCE monitors further observed vehicles apparently used to transport soldiers' dead bodies crossing the Russian-Ukrainian borderMall:Snd in one case a vehicle marked with Russia's military code for soldiers killed in action crossed from Russia into Ukraine on 11 November 2014, and later returned.[158] On 23 January 2015 the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers warned about conscripts being sent to east Ukraine.[159] NATO said it had seen an increase in Russian tanks, artillery pieces and other heavy military equipment in eastern Ukraine and renewed its call for Moscow to withdraw its forces.[160]

The centre for Eurasian Strategic Intelligence estimated, based on "official statements and interrogation records of captured military men from these units, satellite surveillance data" as well as verified announcements from relatives and profiles in social networks, that over 30 Russian military units were taking part in the conflict in Ukraine. In total, over 8,000 soldiers had fought there at different moments.[161] The Chicago Council on Global Affairs stated that the Russian separatists enjoyed technical advantages over the Ukrainian army since the large inflow of advanced military systems in mid-2014: effective anti-aircraft weapons ("Buk", MANPADS) suppressed Ukrainian air strikes, Russian drones provided intelligence, and Russian secure communications system thwarted the Ukrainian side from communications intelligence. The Russian side also frequently employed electronic warfare systems that Ukraine lacked. Similar conclusions about the technical advantage of the Russian separatists were voiced by the Conflict Studies Research Centre.[162]

Numerous reports of Russian troops and warfare on Ukrainian territory were raised in United Nations Security Council meetings. In 12 November meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom also accused Russia of intentionally constraining OSCE observatory missions' capabilities, pointing out that the observers were allowed to monitor only two kilometers of border between Ukraine and Russia, and drones deployed to extend their capabilities were being jammed or shot down.[163]

2015 and ceasefire muuda

 
Pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk in May 2015. Ukraine declared the Russia-backed separatist republics from eastern Ukraine to be terrorist organizations.[164]

In January, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Mariupol were the three cities that represented the three fronts on which Ukraine was pressed by forces allegedly armed, trained and backed by Russia.[165]

Poroshenko spoke of a dangerous escalation on 21 January amid reports of more than 2,000 additional Russian troops crossing the border, together with 200 tanks and armed personnel carriers. He abbreviated his visit to the World Economic Forum in Davos because of his concerns at the worsening situation.[166] On 29 January, the chief of Ukraine's General Military Staff Viktor Muzhenko said 'the Ukrainian army is not engaged in combat operations against Russian regular units,' but that he had information about Russian civilian and military individuals fighting alongside 'illegal armed groups in combat activities.'[167]

Reporting from DPR-controlled areas on 28 January, the OSCE observed on the outskirts of Khartsyzk, east of Donetsk, "a column of five T-72 tanks facing east, and immediately after, another column of four T-72 tanks moving east on the same road which was accompanied by four unmarked military trucks, type URAL. All vehicles and tanks were unmarked." It reported on an intensified movement of unmarked military trucks, covered with canvas.[168] After the shelling of residential areas in Mariupol, NATO's Jens Stoltenberg said: "Russian troops in eastern Ukraine are supporting these offensive operations with command and control systems, air defence systems with advanced surface-to-air missiles, unmanned aerial systems, advanced multiple rocket launcher systems, and electronic warfare systems."'[160][169]

A new package of measures to end the conflict, known as Minsk II, was agreed on 15 February 2015.[170]

2015–2020 frozen conflict phase muuda

According to a top U.S. general in January, Russian supplied drones and electronic jamming have ensured Ukrainian troops struggle to counter artillery fire by pro-Russian militants. "The rebels have Russian-provided UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) that are giving the rebels the detection capability and the ability to target Ukrainian forces".[171] Advanced electronic jamming was also reported by OSCE observers on numerous occasions.[172]

US Army commander in Europe Ben Hodges stated in February 2015 that "it's very obvious from the amount of ammunition, type of equipment, there's direct Russian military intervention in the Debaltseve area".[173] According to estimates by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in February, Russian separatists forces number around 36,000 troops (as compared to 34,000 Ukrainian), of which 8,500–10,000 are purely Russian soldiers. Additionally, around 1,000 GRU troops are operating in the area.[174] According to a military expert, Ilya Kramnik, total Ukrainian forces outnumber the Russian forces by a factor of two (20,000 Russian separatists vs. 40,000 fighting for Ukraine).[175]

 
Casualties of the War in Donbas

In February 2015, the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta had obtained documents,[176] allegedly written by oligarch Konstantin Malofayev and others, which provided the Russian government with a strategy in the event of Viktor Yanukovych's removal from power and the break-up of Ukraine, which were considered likely. The documents outlined plans for the annexation of Crimea and the eastern portions of the country, closely describing the events that actually followed after Yanukovych's fall. The documents also described plans for a public relations campaign which would seek to justify Russian actions.[177][178][179]

Russian financing of militias and Glazyev tapes muuda

In August 2016, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) published the first batch of telephone intercepts from 2014 of Sergey Glazyev (Russian presidential adviser), Konstantin Zatulin, and other people in which they discussed covert funding of pro-Russian activists in Eastern Ukraine, the occupation of administration buildings and other actions that in due course led to the armed conflict.[180]

As early as February 2014, Glazyev give direct instructions to various pro-Russian parties in Ukraine to instigate unrest in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Odessa. He told various pro-Russian actors to take over local administration offices, what to do afterwards, and how to formulate their demands, and promised support from Russia, including "sending our guys".[181][182][183] In further calls recorded in February and March 2014, Glazyev points out that the "peninsula doesn't have its own electricity, water, or gas" and a "quick and effective" solution would be expansion to the north. According to Ukrainian journalists, this indicates that the plans for military intervention in Donbas to form a Russia-controlled puppet state of Novorossiya to ensure supplies to annexed Crimea was discussed long before the conflict actually started in April.

Russian troop deployments muuda

A report by Igor Sutyagin published by the Royal United Services Institute in March 2015 stated that a total of 42,000 regular Russian combat troops have been involved in the fighting, with a peak strength of 10,000 in December 2014. The direct involvement of the Russian troops on Ukrainian territory began in August 2014, at a time when Ukrainian military successes created the possibility that the pro-Russian rebels would collapse. According to the report, the Russian troops are the most capable units on the anti-Ukrainian side, with the regular Donetsk and Luhansk rebel formations being used essentially as "cannon fodder".[184][185]

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs stated that the Russian separatists enjoyed technical advantages over the Ukrainian army since the large inflow of advanced military systems in mid-2014: effective anti-aircraft weapons ("Buk", MANPADS) suppressed Ukrainian air strikes, Russian drones provided intelligence, and Russian secure communications system thwarted the Ukrainian side from communications intelligence. The Russian side also frequently employed electronic warfare systems that Ukraine lacked. Similar conclusions about the technical advantage of the Russian separatists were voiced by the Conflict Studies Research Centre.[185]

Cases of Russian soldiers killed and wounded in Ukraine are widely discussed in local Russian media in the republics from which they originated.[186] Recruitment for Donbas is performed rather openly via veteran and other paramilitary organisations. Vladimir Yefimov, leader of one of such organisations, explained in details in an interview how the process works in the Ural area. The organisation recruits mostly army veterans, but also policemen, firefighters etc. with military experience. The cost of equipping one volunteer is estimated at around 350,000 rubles (around $6500) plus the cost of the volunteer's salary from 60,000 to 240,000 rubles per month depending on their experience.[187]

The volunteers are issued a document claiming that their participation is limited to "offering humanitarian help" to avoid Russian mercenary laws. In Russia's anti-mercenary legislation a mercenary is defined as someone who "takes part [in fighting] with aims counter to the interests of the Russian Federation".[187] The recruits travel to the conflict zone without weapons, which are given at the destination. Often, Russian troops have travelled disguised as Red Cross personnel.[81][188][189][190] Igor Trunov, head of Russian Red Cross in Moscow condemned these convoys, saying they made delivery of real humanitarian aid more difficult.[191]

On 22 April 2015, the US Department of State accused the "combined Russian-separatist forces" of accumulating air defence systems, UAV along with command and control equipment in eastern Ukraine, and of conducting "complex" military training that "leaves no doubt that Russia is involved in the training". Russia is also reinforcing its military presence on the eastern border with Ukraine as well as near Belgorod which is close to Kharkiv.[192] In June 2015, Vice News reporter Simon Ostrovsky investigated the movements of Bato Dambaev, a Russian contract soldier from Buryatia, through a military camp in Rostov Oblast to Vuhlehirsk in Ukraine during the battle of Debaltseve and back to Buryatia, finding exact locations where Dambaev photographed himself, and came to a conclusion that Dambaev had fought in Ukraine while in active service in the Russian army.[193]

With Russia refusing to allow the OSCE to expand its mission, OSCE observer Paul Picard stated that "We often see how Russian media outlets manipulate our statements. They say that we have not seen Russian troops crossing the borders. But that only applies to two border crossings. We have no idea what is going on at the others."[194]

In September 2015 the United Nations Human Rights Office estimated that 8000 casualties had resulted from the conflict, noting that the violence had been "fuelled by the presence and continuing influx of foreign fighters and sophisticated weapons and ammunition from the Russian Federation."[195]

In 2020 analysis of publicly available Russian railway traffic data (gdevagon.ru) indicated that in January 2015, period of especially heavy fighting, thousands of tons of cargo declared "high explosives" was sent by railway from various places in Russia into Uspenskaya, a small train station on a line crossing from Rostovskaya oblast' (Russia) into separatist-controlled part of Ukraine.[196]

2016 escalation muuda

 
Russian-backed separatists in May 2016

On 8 August 2016, Ukraine reported that Russia had increased its military presence along the Crimea demarcation line. Border crossings were then closed.[197] On 10 August, the Russian security agency FSB claimed it had prevented "Ukrainian terrorist attacks" and that two servicemen were killed in clashes in Armiansk (Crimea), adding that "several" Ukrainian and Russian citizens were detained.[198][199][200] Russian media reported that one of the killed soldiers was a commander of the Russian GRU, and later was buried in Simferopol.[201]

The Ukrainian government denied that the incident took place.[202][203] Parallel to the incident on 9 August, a Ukrainian official claimed that a number of Russian soldiers had deserted but had not entered into Ukraine,[204] and that skirmishes broke out between Russian intelligence officers and border guards.[205] Russian President Putin accused Ukraine of turning to the "practice of terror".[206] Ukrainian President Poroshenko called the Russian version of events "equally cynical and insane".[207] The U.S. denied Russia's claims, with its ambassador to Ukraine (Geoffrey R. Pyatt) stating "The U.S. Government has seen nothing so far that corroborates Russian allegations of a "Crimea incursion".[208]Mall:Check quotation

Russia had used the allegation to engage in a rapid military build-up in Crimea,[209] followed by drills and military movement near the Ukrainian border.[209][210] Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko warned that Russia was preparing for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[211][212]

2018 Kerch Strait incident muuda

 
The Kerch Strait incident over the passage between the Black and Azov seas

The Kerch Strait offers a critical link for Ukraine's eastern ports in the Azov Sea to the Black Sea, over which Russia gained de facto control in the aftermath of 2014. In 2017, Ukraine appealed to court of arbitration over the use of the strait, but, by 2018 Russia had built a bridge over it, limiting the size of ships that could transit the strait, imposed new regulations, and subsequently detained Ukrainian vessels on several occasions.

Tensions over the issue had been rising for months.[213] On 25 November 2018, three Ukrainian boats traveling from Odessa to Mariupol attempted to cross the Kerch Strait caused an incident, in which Russian warships fired on and seized the Ukrainian boats; 24 Ukrainian sailors were detained.[214][215] A day later on 26 November 2018, lawmakers in the Ukrainian parliament overwhelmingly backed the imposition of martial law along Ukraine's coastal regions and those bordering Russia in response to the firing and seizure of Ukrainian naval ships by Russia near the Crimean peninsula. A total of 276 lawmakers in Kyiv approved the measure, to take effect on 28 November 2018 and automatically expire after 30 days.[216]

2019–2020 muuda

 
From left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris, France, December 2019

More than 110 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in 2019.[217] In May 2019, the newly elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky took office promising to end the War in Donbas.[217] In December 2019, Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists began swapping prisoners of war. Around 200 prisoners were exchanged on 29 December 2019.[218][219][220][221] According to Ukrainian authorities, 50 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in 2020.[222] Since 2019, Russia has issued over 650,000 internal Russian passports among an unconfirmed overall population,[223] which is considered by Ukrainian government as a step towards annexation of the region.[224]

2021–2022 Russian military buildup muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis Prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Rise in tensions muuda

 
US paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment depart Italy's Aviano Air Base for Latvia, 23 February 2022. Thousands of US troops were deployed to Eastern Europe amid Russia's military build-up.[225]

From March to April 2021, Russia commenced a major military build-up near the Russo-Ukrainian border, followed by a second build-up between October 2021 to February 2022 in both Russia and Belarus.[226] During these developments, the Russian government repeatedly denied it had plans to invade or attack Ukraine;[227][228] those who issued the denials included Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov in November 2021, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov in January 2022,[229] Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov on 20 February 2022,[227] and Russian ambassador to the Czech Republic Alexander Zmeevsky on 23 February 2022.[230]

In early December 2021, following Russian denials, the US released intelligence of Russian invasion plans, including satellite photographs showing Russian troops and equipment near the Ukrainian border.[231] The intelligence reported the existence of a Russian list of key sites and individuals to be killed or neutralized upon invasion.[232] The US continued to release reports that accurately predicted the invasion plans,[232] but according to Michael Kofman of the Center for Naval Analyses, the Ukrainian government did not adequately prepare for a large invasion.[233]

Russian accusations and demands muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis Russian opposition to Ukrainian NATO membership
 
Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna with NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg at a conference on 10 January 2022 regarding a potential Russian invasion

In the months preceding the invasion, Russian officials accused Ukraine of inciting tensions, Russophobia, and the repression of Russian speakers in Ukraine. They also made multiple security demands of Ukraine, NATO, and non-NATO allies in the EU. These actions were described by commentators and Western officials as attempts to justify war.[234][235] On 9 December 2021 Putin said that "Russophobia is a first step towards genocide".[236][237] Putin's claims were dismissed by the international community,[238] and Russian claims of genocide have been widely rejected as baseless.[239][240][241]

In a 21 February speech,[242] Putin questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, repeating an inaccurate claim that "Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood".[243] He incorrectly described the country as having been created by Soviet Russia.[244] To justify an invasion, Putin falsely accused Ukrainian society and government of being dominated by neo-Nazism, invoking the history of collaboration in German-occupied Ukraine during World War II,[245][246] and echoing an antisemitic conspiracy theory which casts Russian Christians, rather than Jews, as the true victims of Nazi Germany.[247][238] While Ukraine has a far-right fringe, including the neo-Nazi Azov Battalion and Right Sector,[248][249] analysts have described Putin's rhetoric as greatly exaggerating the influence of far-right groups within Ukraine; there is no widespread support for the ideology in the government, military, or electorate.[234][245] The Poroshenko administration enforced the law condemning the Soviet Union and the Nazis in 2015. Ukrainian president Zelenskyy, who is Jewish, stated that his grandfather served in the Soviet army fighting against the Nazis;[250] three of his family members died in the Holocaust.[251]

 
A U.S. intelligence assessment map and imagery on Russian military movement nearby the Ukrainian border, as on 3 December 2021. It assessed that Russia had deployed about 70,000 military personnel mostly about Mall:Convert from the Ukrainian border, with an assessment this could be increased to 175,000 personnel. Published by The Washington Post.[252]

During the second build-up, Russia issued demands to the US and NATO, including a legally binding arrangement preventing Ukraine from ever joining NATO, and the removal of multinational forces stationed in NATO's Eastern European member states.[253] Russia threatened an unspecified military response if NATO continued to follow an "aggressive line".[254] These demands were widely interpreted as being non-viable; new NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe had joined the alliance because their populations broadly preferred to move towards the safety and economic opportunities offered by NATO and the EU, and their governments sought protection from Russian irredentism.[255] The demand for a formal treaty preventing Ukraine from joining NATO was also seen as unviable by Western officials as it would contravene the treaty's "open door" policy, although NATO showed no desire to accede to Ukraine's requests to join.[256]

Alleged clashes (17–21 February) muuda

Fighting in Donbas escalated significantly from 17 February 2022 onwards.[257] The Ukrainians and the Russian separatists each accused the other of firing into their territory.[258][259] On 18 February, the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics ordered mandatory emergency evacuations of civilians from their respective capital cities,[260][261][262] although observers noted that full evacuations would take months.[263] Ukrainian media reported a sharp increase in artillery shelling by the Russian-led militants in Donbas as attempts to provoke the Ukrainian army.[264][265]

In the days leading up to the invasion, the Russian government intensified its disinformation campaign, with Russian state media promoting fabricated videos (false flags) on a nearly hourly basis purporting to show Ukrainian forces attacking Russia, in a bid to justify an invasion of Ukraine.[266] Many of the disinformation videos were poor and amateur in quality, and evidence showed that the claimed attacks, explosions, and evacuations in Donbas were staged by Russia.[266][267][268]

Escalation (21–23 February) muuda

Putin's address to the nation on 21 February (English subtitles available)

On 21 February at 22:35 (UTC+3),[269] Putin announced that the Russian government would diplomatically recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics.[270] The same evening, Putin directed that Russian troops be deployed into Donbas, in what Russia referred to as a "peacekeeping mission".[271][272] The 21 February intervention in Donbas was condemned by several members of the UN Security Council; none voiced support for it.[273] On 22 February, the Federation Council unanimously authorised Putin to use military force outside Russia.[274]

In response, Zelenskyy ordered the conscription of army reservists;[275] The following day, Ukraine's parliament proclaimed a 30-day nationwide state of emergency and ordered the mobilisation of all reservists.[276][277][278] Meanwhile, Russia began to evacuate its embassy in Kyiv.[279] The websites of the Ukrainian parliament and government, along with banking websites, were hit by DDoS attacks,[280] widely attributed to Russian-backed hackers.[281][282]

On the night of 23 February,[283] Zelenskyy gave a speech in Russian in which he appealed to the citizens of Russia to prevent war.[284][285] He also refuted Russia's claims about the presence of neo-Nazis in the Ukrainian government and stated that he had no intention of attacking the Donbas region.[286] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on 23 February that the separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk had sent a letter to Putin stating that Ukrainian shelling had caused civilian deaths and appealing for military support from Russia.[287]

In response, Ukraine requested an urgent UN Security Council meeting,[288] which convened at 21:30 (UTC−5).[289] Half an hour into the emergency meeting, Putin announced the start of military operations in Ukraine. Sergiy Kyslytsya, the Ukrainian representative, subsequently called on the Russian representative, Vasily Nebenzya, to "do everything possible to stop the war" or relinquish his position as president of the UN Security Council; Nebenzya refused.[290][291]

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis Venemaa sissetung Ukrainasse
 
An animated map of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

On 21 February 2022, the Russian government claimed that Ukrainian shelling had destroyed an FSB border facility on the Russia-Ukraine border, and claimed that it had killed 5 Ukrainian soldiers who tried to cross into Russian territory. Ukraine denied having been involved in both incidents and called them false flag operations.[292][293] On the same day, the Russian government formally recognized the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR as independent states, not only in their de facto controlled areas, but throughout each of the Ukrainian oblasts,[294] and Putin ordered Russian military forces to enter the regions.[295][296][297]

On 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an invasion of Ukraine by Russian armed forces previously concentrated along the border.[298] The invasion included attacks across the Belarus-Ukraine border and was followed by targeted airstrikes on military buildings in Ukraine.[299][300] The Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in response, enacted martial law and general mobilization throughout Ukraine.[301] Air raid sirens were heard throughout Ukraine for most of the day.[302]

Ukraine's ICT infrastructure has been degraded as a result of Russian cyber-attacks and bombardments.[303][304] Several Ukrainian cities and infrastructure sites have been occupied, including the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.[305][306][307] According to a US defence official, commenting on 25 February, Russian forces are "meeting more resistance" in their advance towards Kyiv "than they expected";[308] this was repeated by James Heappey, Britain's Minister for the Armed Forces the next day.[309]

Violations of human rights muuda

The war has been accompanied by violations of human rights. From 2014 to 2021, there were more than 3,000 civilian casualties.[310] The right of movement was impeded for the inhabitants of the conflict zone.[311] The arbitrary detention was practiced by both sides in the first years of the conflict. It decreased after 2016 in the government-held areas while in the separatist-held ones it continued in 2021.[312] The investigation into the abuses, including torture, committed by both sides made little progress.[313][314] According to OHCHR the closure of three TV channels amounted to a violation of the freedom of expression.[313] There were cases of conflict-related sexual violence, however OHCHR believe that "there are no grounds to believe that sexual violence has been used for strategic or tactical ends by Government forces or the armed groups in the eastern regions of Ukraine."[315]

Related issues muuda

Russia–Ukraine gas disputes muuda

 
Major Russian natural gas pipelines to Europe

Ukraine remains the main transit route for Russian natural gas sold to Europe, which earns Ukraine about $3 billion a year in transit fees, making it the country's most lucrative export service.[316] Following Russia's launch of the Nord Stream pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine, gas transit volumes have been steadily decreasing.[316] During the Ukrainian crisis, starting in February 2014 with the Russian annexation of Crimea, severe tensions extended to the gas sector.[317][318] The outbreak of war in the Donbas region forced the suspension of a project to develop Ukraine's own shale gas reserves at the Yuzivska gas field, which had been planned as a way to reduce Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas imports.[319] Eventually, the EU commissioner for energy Günther Oettinger was called in to broker a deal securing supplies to Ukraine and transit to the EU.[320]

A terrorist explosion damaged Russia's Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhhorod pipeline in Rozhniativ district in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, Ukraine in May 2014.[321] Another section of the pipeline exploded in the Poltava Oblast on 17 June 2014, one day after Russia limited the supply of gas to Ukrainian customers due to non-payment. Ukraine's Interior Minister Arsen Avakov said the next day, that the explosion had been caused by a bomb.[322]

Russia planned to completely abandon gas supplies to Europe through Ukraine after 2018.[323][324] Russia's state-owned energy giant Gazprom has already substantially reduced the volumes of gas it transits across Ukraine, and expressed its intention of reducing the level further by means of transit diversification pipelines (Turkish Stream, Nord Stream, etc.).[325] Gazprom and Ukraine agreed a five-year deal on Russian gas transit to Europe at the end of 2019.[326][327]

In 2020, the TurkStream natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey changed the regional gas flows in South-East Europe by diverting the transit through Ukraine and the Trans Balkan Pipeline system.[328][329]

In May 2021, the Biden administration waived Trump's CAATSA sanctions on the company behind Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany and its chief executive.[330][331] Ukrainian President Zelensky said he was "surprised" and "disappointed" by Joe Biden's decision.[332] In July 2021, the U.S. urged Ukraine not to criticise a forthcoming agreement with Germany over the pipeline.[333][334]

On 20 July 2021, Joe Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel reached a conclusive deal that the U.S. may trigger sanctions if Russia uses Nord Stream as a "political weapon". The deal aims to prevent Poland and Ukraine from being cut off from Russian gas supplies. Ukraine will get a $50 million loan for green technology until 2024 and Germany will set up a billion dollar fund to promote Ukraine's transition to green energy to compensate the loss of the gas transit fees. The contract for transiting Russian gas through Ukraine will be prolonged until 2034, if the Russian government agrees.[335][336][337]

In August 2021, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline between Russia and Germany was "a dangerous weapon, not only for Ukraine but for the whole of Europe."[338][339] In September 2021, Ukraine's Naftogaz CEO Yuriy Vitrenko accused Russia of using natural gas as a "geopolitical weapon".[340] Vitrenko stated that "A joint statement from the United States and Germany said that if the Kremlin used gas as a weapon, there would be an appropriate response. We are now waiting for the imposition of sanctions on a 100% subsidiary of Gazprom, the operator of Nord Stream 2."[341]

Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns muuda

  Pikemalt artiklites Russian information war against Ukraine ja Russian disinformation since 2000

False stories have been used to provoke public uproar during the war. In April 2014, Russian news channels Russia-1 and NTV showed a man saying he was attacked by a fascist Ukrainian gang on one channel and on the other channel saying he was funding the training of right-wing anti-Russia radicals.[342][343] A third segment portrayed the man as a neo-Nazi surgeon.[344] In May 2014, Russia-1 aired a story about Ukrainian atrocities using footage of a 2012 Russian operation in North Caucasus.[345] In the same month, the Russian news network Life presented a 2013 photograph of a wounded child in Syria as a victim of Ukrainian troops who had just retaken Donetsk International Airport.[346]

In June 2014, several Russian state news outlets reported that Ukraine was using white phosphorus using 2004 footage of white phosphorus being used by the United States in Iraq.[345] In July 2014, Channel One Russia broadcast an interview with a woman who said that a 3-year-old boy who spoke Russian was crucified by Ukrainian nationalists in a fictitious square in Sloviansk that turned to be false.[347][348][343][345]

In 2022, Russian state media told stories of genocide and mass graves full of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine. One set of graves outside Luhansk was dug when intense fighting in 2014 cut off the electricity in the local morgue. Amnesty International investigated 2014 Russian claims of mass graves filled with hundreds of bodies and instead found isolated incidents of extrajudicial executions by both sides.[349][350][351]

Putin and Russian media have described the government of Ukraine as being led by neo-Nazis persecuting ethnic Russians who are in need of protection by Russia, despite Ukraine's President Zelensky being Jewish.[352][353][350] Ukraine's rejection of the adoption of Russia-initiated General Assembly resolutions on combating the glorification of Nazism, the latest iteration of which is General Assembly Resolution A/C.3/76/L.57/Rev.1 on Combating Glorification of Nazism, Neo-Nazism and other Practices that Contribute to Fueling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, serve to present Ukraine as a pro-Nazi state, and indeed likely forms the basis for Russia's claims, with the only other state rejecting the adoption of the resolution being the US.[354][355] The Deputy US Representative for ECOSOC describes such resolutions as "thinly veiled attempts to legitimize Russian disinformation campaigns denigrating neighboring nations and promoting the distorted Soviet narrative of much of contemporary European history, using the cynical guise of halting Nazi glorification".[356]

Reactions muuda

Mall:For

To the Russian invasion in Crimea muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis International reactions to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
Vaata ka: Cold War II

Ukrainian response muuda

 
Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, Ukraine blocked the North Crimean Canal, which provided 85% of Crimea's drinking and irrigation water.[357]

Interim Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov accused Russia of "provoking a conflict" by backing the seizure of the Crimean parliament building and other government offices on the Crimean peninsula. He compared Russia's military actions to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, when Russian troops occupied parts of the Republic of Georgia and the breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were established under the control of Russian-backed administrations. He called on Putin to withdraw Russian troops from Crimea and stated that Ukraine will "preserve its territory" and "defend its independence".[358] On 1 March, he warned, "Military intervention would be the beginning of war and the end of any relations between Ukraine and Russia."[359] On 1 March, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov placed the Armed Forces of Ukraine on full alert and combat readiness.[360]

The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs was established by Ukrainian government on 20 April 2016 to manage occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea regions affected by Russian military intervention of 2014.[361]

NATO and United States military response muuda

  Pikemalt artiklites Operation Atlantic Resolve, European Deterrence Initiative, NATO Enhanced Forward Presence ja NATO–Russia relations
 
US officials Assistant Secretary Nuland and Ambassador to Ukraine Pyatt greet Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in Warsaw on 4 June 2014
 
A U.S. Army convoy in Vilseck, Germany during Operation Atlantic Resolve, NATO's efforts to reassert its military presence in central and eastern Europe that began in April 2014.
 
U.S. Paratroopers and Ukrainian National Guard during the Fearless Guardian exercise near Yavoriv, Ukraine, 6 June 2015

On 4 March 2014, the United States pledged $1 billion in aid to Ukraine.[362] Russia's actions increased tensions in nearby countries historically within its sphere of influence, particularly the Baltic and Moldova. All have large Russian-speaking populations, and Russian troops are stationed in the breakaway Moldovan territory of Transnistria.[363] Some devoted resources to increasing defensive capabilities,[364] and many requested increased support from the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which they had joined in recent years.[363][364] The conflict "reinvigorated" NATO, which had been created to face the Soviet Union, but had devoted more resources to "expeditionary missions" in recent years.[365]

In 2014, Alexander Vershbow said, that Russia "have declared NATO as an adversary", adding, that NATO must do the same.[366] Initial deployments in March and early April were restricted to increased air force monitoring and training in the Baltics and Poland, and single ships in the Black Sea.[366][367] On 16 April, officials announced the deployment of ships to the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, and increasing exercises in "Eastern Europe". The measures were apparently limited so as not to appear aggressive.[368]

Leaders emphasized that the conflict was not a new Cold War[369] but Robert Legvold disagreed.[369] OthersMall:Who supported applying George F. Kennan's concept of containment to possible Russian expansion.[370][371] Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul said, "We are enduring a drift of disengagement in world affairs. As we pull back, Russia is pushing forward. I worry about the new nationalism that Putin has unleashed and understand that many young Russians also embrace these extremist ideas."[372]

In addition to diplomatic support in its conflict with Russia, the U.S. provided Ukraine with US$1.5 billion in military aid during the 2010s.[373] In 2018 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a provision blocking any training of Azov Battalion of the Ukrainian National Guard by American forces. In previous years, between 2014 and 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed amendments banning support of Azov, but due to pressure from the Pentagon, the amendments were quietly lifted.[374][375][376]

On 24 September 2019 the U.S. House of Representatives initiated an impeachment inquiry against incumbent U.S. president Donald Trump in the wake of scandal surrounding a phone conversation that Trump had with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on 25 July.[377] In December 2021, Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin spoke on the phone for two hours and they discussed the issue. Biden mentioned that he would put sanctions on Russia if Russian army men entered Ukraine.[378]

International diplomatic and economic responses muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis International reactions to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
 
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry meets with Ukrainian members of parliament, 4 March 2014

Several members of the international community have expressed grave concerns over the Russian intervention in Ukraine and criticized Russia for its actions in post-revolutionary Ukraine, including the United States,[379] the United Kingdom,[380] France,[381] Germany,[382] Italy,[383] Poland,[384] Canada,[385] Japan,[386] the Netherlands,[387] Norway,[388] South Korea,[389] Georgia,[390] Moldova,[391] Turkey,[392] Australia[393] and the European Union as a whole, which condemned Russia, accusing it of breaking international law and violating Ukrainian sovereignty.[394]

Many of these countries implemented economic sanctions against Russia or Russian individuals or companies, to which Russia responded in kind. Amnesty International has expressed its belief that Russia is fuelling the conflict.[395] The UN Security Council held a special meeting 1 March 2014 on the crisis.[396] The G7 countries condemned the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, and urged Russia to withdraw.[397][398] All G7 leaders are refusing to participate in it due to assumed violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, in contravention of Russia's obligations under the UN Charter and its 1997 basing agreement with Ukraine.[399]

In 2014, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly published a statement (the "Baku Declaration") discussing the events in Ukraine in detail. Specifically, it pointed out that Russia is a signatory of the Helsinki Accords and committed to observing its rules, including respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other member countries, as well as the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances that specifically guaranteed the integrity of Ukraine's borders. As noted by the OSCE, "Russian Federation has, since February 2014, violated every one of the ten Helsinki principles in its relations with Ukraine, some in a clear, gross and thus far uncorrected manner, and is in violation with the commitments it undertook in the Budapest Memorandum, as well as other international obligations". OSCE condemned actions of the Russian Federation, calling them "coercion" and "military aggression" that are "designed to subordinate the rights inherent in Ukraine's sovereignty to the Russian Federation's own interests".[400]

In 2016 the OSCE deputy mission head in Ukraine Alexander Hug summarized the mission's two years of observations stating that "since the beginning of the conflict" the mission has seen "armed people with Russian insignia", vehicle tracks crossing border between Russia and Ukraine as well as talked to prisoners who were declaring themselves Russian soldiers.[401]

In January 2015, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) accepted a resolution that noted "the direct involvement of the Russian Federation in the emergence and worsening of the situation in these parts of Ukraine" and called both sides to fully respect the terms of Minsk Agreement.[402]

In June 2015, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly repeated condemnation of "Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including its illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea" ("Helsinki Declaration").[403] On 28 August 2015 Poland's newly elected President Andrzej Duda said in Berlin during talks with German President Joachim Gauck and Chancellor Angela Merkel that Poland is already taking in large numbers of refugees from the Ukraine conflict as part of the EU's refugee programme, and does not intend to join in talks conducted since 2014 by France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine.[404]

 
██ Russia

Countries that have introduced sanctions on Russia in 2014:
██ Countries that have introduced sanctions
██ European Union countries that have collectively introduced sanctions

The policy of strategic partnership between Kyiv and Warsaw requires further strengthening of military and technical cooperation,[405] best exemplified by the Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade.[406] The more immediate task that informed Poland's State secretary Krzysztof Szczerski, is Ukraine's constitutional reform leading to broad decentralization of power, in which Poland's post-Soviet experience is going to be used.[405]

In August 2017, President Donald Trump signed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which has targeted Russia's oil and gas industry, defence and security sectors, and financial institutions.[407][408] Trump's administration imposed sanctions on several third countries for buying Russian weapons.[409][410]

Financial markets muuda

The initial reaction to the escalation of tensions in Crimea caused the Russian and European stock market to tumble.[411] The intervention caused the Swiss franc climbed to a 2-year high against the dollar and 1-year high against the Euro. The Euro and the US dollar both rose, as did the Australian dollar.[412] The Russian stock market declined by more than 10 percent, whilst the Russian ruble hit all-time lows against the US dollar and the Euro.[413][414][415] The Russian central bank hiked interest rates and intervened in the foreign exchange markets to the tune of $12 billion to try to stabilize its currency.[412] Prices for wheat and grain rose, with Ukraine being a major exporter of both crops.[416]

Later in March 2014, the reaction of the financial markets to the Crimea annexation was surprisingly mellow, with global financial markets rising immediately after the referendum held in Crimea, one explanation being that the sanctions were already priced in following the earlier Russian incursion.[417] Other observers considered that the positive reaction of the global financial markets on Monday 17 March 2014, after the announcement of sanctions against Russia by the EU and the US, revealed that these sanctions were too weak to hurt Russia.[418] In early August 2014, the German DAX was down by 6 percent for the year, and 11 percent since June, over concerns Russia, Germany's 13th biggest trade partner, would retaliate against sanctions.[419]

To the Russian intervention in Donbas muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis International reactions to the war in Donbas
  • Amnesty International considers the war to be "an international armed conflict" and presented an independent satellite photo analysis proving involvement of regular Russian army in the conflict. It accuses Ukrainian militia and separatist forces as being responsible for war crimes and has called on all parties, including Russia, to stop violations of the laws of war.[395] Amnesty has expressed its belief that Russia is fueling the conflict, 'both through direct interference and by supporting the separatists in the East' and called on Russia to 'stop the steady flow of weapons and other support to an insurgent force heavily implicated in gross human rights violations.'[395]
  • Mall:Flag – The Russian government's decision to send a truck convoy into Luhansk on 22 August 2014 without Ukrainian consent was condemned by NATO and several NATO member states, including the United States.[420] NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called it "a blatant breach of Russia's international commitments" and "a further violation of Ukraine's sovereignty by Russia".[421]
  • Mall:Flag – Leaders warned that Russia faced harsher economic sanctions than the EU had previously imposed if it failed to withdraw troops from Ukraine.[422] In 2015 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE] published a resolution that openly speaks about a "Russian aggression in Ukraine".[423]
  • Mall:Flagcountry – Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament Oleksandr Turchynov said "It's a hybrid war that Russia has begun against Ukraine, a war with the participation of the Russian security services and the army."[424]
  • Mall:Flagcountry – US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power commented on the invasion by noting that "At every step, Russia has come before this council to say everything but the truth. It has manipulated, obfuscated and outright lied. Russia has to stop lying and has to stop fuelling this conflict."[133][425] The United States government said it supported stiffer sanctions as well.[426]
  • Nordic countries  – On 9 April 2015, a joint declaration by the ministers of defence of Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden and the minister of foreign affairs of Iceland (which does not have a ministry of defence) was brought by the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten. The declaration first asserts that the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea is a violation of international law and other international treaties and that the Nordic countries must judge Russia not by the rhetoric of the Kremlin, but by the actions of the country. After pointing out that Russia has increased its military exercise and intelligence gathering activity in the Baltic and Northern areas violating Nordic borders and jeopardizing civilian air traffic, the declaration states the intention of the Nordic countries to face this new situation with solidarity and increased cooperation. The Nordic unity commitment is extended to include solidarity with the Baltic countries and to a collaboration within NATO and EU to strengthen also the unity within these entities and to maintain the cross-Atlantic link.[427]

Russian protests muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis 2014 anti-war protests in Russia
 
Protests in Moscow, 21 September 2014

Street protests against the war in Ukraine have arisen in Russia itself. Notable protests first occurred in March[428][429] and large protests occurred in September when "tens of thousands" protested the war in Ukraine with a peace march in downtown Moscow on Sunday, 21 September 2014, "under heavy police supervision".[430]

Critics of Vladimir Putin also express cautious criticism in the press and social media. Garry Kasparov, a consistent critic of Putin, whom he has called "a revanchist KGB thug", has written[431] on the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shootdown and called for Western action.[432][433]

 
Pro-Russian supporters in Donetsk, 20 December 2014

An August 2014 survey by the Levada Centre reported that only 13% of those Russians polled would support the Russian government in an open war with Ukraine.[434]

Ukrainian public opinion muuda

Vaata ka: Putin huilo!

A poll of the Ukrainian public, excluding Russian-annexed Crimea, was taken by the International Republican Institute from 12 to 25 September 2014.[435] 89% of those polled opposed 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine. As broken down by region, 78% of those polled from Eastern Ukraine (including Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) opposed said intervention, along with 89% in Southern Ukraine, 93% in Central Ukraine, and 99% in Western Ukraine.[435] As broken down by native language, 79% of Russian speakers and 95% of Ukrainian speakers opposed the intervention. 80% of those polled said the country should remain a unitary country.[435]

A poll of the Crimean public in Russian-annexed Crimea was taken by the Ukrainian branch of Germany's biggest market research organization, GfK, on 16–22 January 2015. According to its results: "Eighty-two percent of those polled said they fully supported Crimea's inclusion in Russia, and another 11 percent expressed partial support. Only 4 percent spoke out against it."[436][437][438]

International reaction muuda

 
U.S. President Joe Biden holds a video call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 7 December 2021

In March 2014, Estonia's president Toomas Hendrik Ilves said: "Justification of a military invasion by a fabricated need to protect ethnic "compatriots" resuscitates the arguments used to annex Sudetenland in 1938."[439] During the Group of 20 (G-20) summit of world leaders in Brisbane, Australia in November 2014, an incident occurred during private meetings that became quite public. At the private leaders' retreat, held the weekend before the official opening of the summit, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper told Russian President Vladimir Putin "I guess I'll shake your hand but I have only one thing to say to you: You need to get out of Ukraine." The incident occurred as Putin approached Harper and a group of G-20 leaders and extended his hand toward Harper. After the event was over, a "spokesman for the Russian delegation said Putin's response was: 'That's impossible because we are not there'."[440]

In March 2015, NATO's top commander in Europe General Philip M. Breedlove has been criticized by German politicians and diplomats as spreading "dangerous propaganda" by constantly inflating the figures of Russian military involvement in an attempt to subvert the diplomatic solution of the war in Donbas spearheaded by German Chancellor Angela Merkel.[441][442] According to Germany's Der Spiegel magazine, "the German government, supported by intelligence gathered by the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany's foreign intelligence agency, did not share the view of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)."[441]

In 2017, Ukraine opened a case against Russia for involvement and financing of terrorism and racial discrimination in military occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and part of Donbas.[443][444]

In 2022, UK defence minister Ben Wallace characterized President Putin's article "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" as "a seven-thousand-word essay that puts ethnonationalism at the heart of his ambitions... It provides the skewed and selective reasoning to justify, at best, the subjugation of Ukraine and at worse the forced unification of that sovereign country."[445]

A Normandy Format meeting was planned between Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France in Paris on 26 January 2022,[446] with a follow-up phone call between French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Putin.[447] Ukraine fulfilled Russia's condition for a meeting in Paris and decided to withdraw from Parliament the controversial draft law on the reintegration of the Crimea and Donbas region, because the law was contrary to the Minsk peace agreements.[448][449]

In February 2022, Russia held the rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council, and diplomats from other countries warned that Russia could take advantage of the UNSC presidency to delay meetings on actions by Russia.[450]

The deliveries of the United States lethal aid to Ukraine included .50 BMG caliber ammunition, M141 Bunker Defeat Munition and FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles.[451] US also intends to transfer Mi-17 helicopters to Ukraine, previously used by Afghan Air Force.[452] In January 2022, the Biden administration approved deliveries of U.S.-made FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine.[453] On 21 January 2022, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki stated that "In the last year alone, we committed $650 million in security assistance to Ukraine; in total, since 2014, we've committed $2.7 billion. These deliveries are ongoing, including today there's more deliveries coming."[454][455][456][457]

Russophobia has increased because Russian citizens' low level of protest activity against the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Some in the EU believe this means support for the Kremlin's militaristic actions.[458]

2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine muuda

  Pikemalt artiklis Reactions to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Mall:Expand section On 5 March 2022, Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett met with Russian President Putin in Moscow as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, as requested by Ukrainian President Zelensky. The meeting occurred after a series of phone calls between Bennett and Putin, and with the coordination of France, Germany, and the United States.[459]

On 20 March 2022, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida visited India, urging his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi to take tougher line against the Russian invasion.[460] It was reported a few days earlier that the Indian Oil Corporation bought 3 million barrels of oil from Russia despite pressure for sanctions.[461][462]

On 20 March 2022, Chinese diplomat Qin Gang denied US allegations that China was willing to provide military aid to Russia.[463] Reuters reported a day later that China would provide 10 million yuan of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, in addition to an earlier donation of 5 million.[464][465] Ambassador to Ukraine Fan Xianrong said a few days earlier that China and Ukraine were "strategic partners" and that they would "respect the path chosen by Ukrainians because this is the sovereign right of every nation".[466][467]

See also muuda

Mall:Portal

Notes muuda

Mall:Notelist

References muuda

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Further reading muuda

Mall:Refbegin

  • Bowen, Andrew (2017). "Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy in Eastern Ukraine". Journal of Strategic Studies. 42 (3–4): 312–343. DOI:10.1080/01402390.2017.1413550. S2CID 158522112.
  • Bremmer, Ian (1994). "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine". Europe-Asia Studies. 46 (2): 261–283. DOI:10.1080/09668139408412161.
  • Hagendoorn, A.; Linssen, H.; Tumanov, S. V. (2001). Intergroup Relations in States of the former Soviet Union: The Perception of Russians. New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-84169-231-9.
  • Legvold, Robert (2013). Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-51217-6.

Mall:Refend

External links muuda